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"What ever happened to 'Hands off the Net?' "1  
Back in the 1990s, Internet communications policy was easier.  It 
was easy to agree that the network's growth ought not be impended by 
excessive government regulation.  It was easy to hope that the Internet 
would solve all of its own problems.  Yet it turned out that the success of 
the network was hiding strong differences of opinion.  Today, the 
euphoria is gone, and the divide in Internet communications policy has 
become clear and unmistakable.  It most clearly a divide between two 
distinct groups: the self-proclaimed ''Openists'' and ''Deregulationists.''   
This divide will do much to inform the reform of the 
Telecommunications Act in general, and Broadband policy in particular. 
 
 ∗ Visiting Professor, Columbia Law School, Associate Professor, University of Virginia 
School of Law.  My thanks to participants at the 2004 Silicon Flatirons conference, and the 
March 26, 2004 Policy Forum ‘‘The Future Of The Internet In The Broadband Age’’ 
organized by the Consumer Federation of America and the Stanford Center for Internet and 
Society. Specific thanks for comments from Phil Weiser and Mark Cooper, discussions with 
Jim Speta, Christopher Yoo and Mark Lemley, and to Lee Kovarksy for research assistance. 
 1. Adam Thierer, Congressional Tech Agenda for Rest of Year = Just More Regulation, 
THE TECHNOLOGY LIBERATION FRONT (Sept. 7, 2004), at http://www.techliberation.com/ 
archives/014257.php. 
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Accordingly, this Article is meant as a user's guide to the broadband 
policy debate:  a guide to what separates us, and what might make 
reconciliation possible.  It is optimistic that policy reconciliation is 
possible, though aware that saying so doesn't make it likely.    
The summary of the debate is critical.  I fault the Openists for being 
too prone to favor regulation without making clear the connection 
between ends and means.  For example, too few Openists have asked the 
degree to which the structural ‘‘open access’’ remedies pushed by 
independent service providers actually promote the Openists’ vision.2  
Meanwhile, I fault the Deregulationists for two reasons.  First, the 
Deregulationists have overlooked the fact that limiting government, as 
they desire, sometimes requires government action.  Remedies like 
network neutrality, for reasons I suggest, may be as important for control 
of government as of industry.  I also fault the Deregulationists for an 
exaggerated faith in industry decision-making.  I suggest that some 
Deregulationists have failed to familiarize themselves with the processes 
of industry decision-making before demanding deference to it.  This is a 
particularly serious problem given that the telecommunications industry 
has a recent track record of terrible judgment and even outright fraud.  
An important example is the demand of some Deregulationists that 
deference is due to a so-called ‘‘smart pipe’’ vision, without analysis of 
whether that vision has any independent merit. 
The article, finally, explores a reconciliation of the broadband 
debate with the network neutrality principle as a starting point.  
Deregulations and Openists, while divided along many lines, share a 
common faith in innovation as the basis of economic growth.  Both 
sides, in short, worship Joseph Schumpeter and his ideas of competitive, 
capitalistic innovation.  Fidelity to this shared faith should mean mutual 
surrender of idealized models of either government or powerful private 
entities, respectively, in exchange for a shared cynicism.  We should 
recognize that both government and the private sector have an unhappy 
record of blocking the new in favor of the old, and that such tendencies 
are likely to continue. 
Reconciliation, I (optimistically) believe, is possible.  The 
Deregulationist and Openist ought remember their common dedication 
to a single principle: free and unmediated market entry, symbolized by 
the rubber-cup of Hush-A-Phone.3  It is by returning to such points of 
consensus that the reconciliation of communications policy can begin. 
 
 2. See also Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON 
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 141 (2003) (expanding on this point). 
 3. See Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266, 269 (D.C. Cir. 1956) 
(holding that the FCC cannot block the attachment of reasonable network attachments, 
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I argue that neither Deregulationists or Openists should have reason 
to oppose Network Neutrality rules that create rights in users to use the 
applications or equipment of their choice.  This is a position that many 
Deregulationists, including FCC Chairman Michael Powell, have come 
to endorse.  What both sides should want in an inevitable regulatory 
framework for broadband are rules that pre-commit both industry and 
government to open market entry.  It must be remembered that rules 
creating rights in users also guarantee the right of operators to enter the 
application market, free of government hindrance.  For these and other 
reasons discussed below, limited network neutrality rules should on 
reflection be attractive to both sides. 
Section I describes the emergent divide in the visions of the future 
that underlie today’s policy divisions.  Section II explains some of what 
unites and divides in the economics of the Deregulationists.  Section III 
argues for broadband reconciliation premised on user rights to access the 
content, applications and equipment of their choice. 
I. VISIONS OF THE FUTURE 
Communications theorists, like everyone else, have their visions of 
an ideal future that drive more of their arguments than they would like to 
admit.  While the theorist’s utopia has much less sand and sunshine than 
the average person’s, its importance is nonetheless axiomatic. 
A. The Openists 
In the communications world some technologies attract what you 
might call a high chatter to deployment ratio.  That means the volume of 
talk about the technology exceeds, by an absurd ratio, the actual number 
of deployments.  ‘‘Videophones’’ are a great historical example, as is 
‘‘Video-on-Demand’’ and, of course, the glacial sixth version of the 
Internet protocol (IPv6).  In the 1990s, the technology named Voice over 
IP (VoIP) was a starring member of this suspect class.  The technology 
promises carriage of voice signals using Internet technology, an attractive 
idea, and in the 1990s and the early 2000s it was discussed endlessly 
despite minimal deployment. 
The discussion usually centered on the question: when would 
broadband carriers deploy VoIP?  And the answer was always, ‘‘not quite 
yet.’’  There were reasons.  Many within the industry argued that VoIP 
was not a viable technology without substantial network improvements.  
Engineers said that the Internet Protocol was too inconsistent to 
guarantee voice service of a quality that any customer would buy.  
 
namely the ‘‘Hush-A-Phone’’ device that attached to a handset and insulated telephone 
conversations against background noise). 
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Industry regulatory strategists, meanwhile, were concerned that offering 
voice service would attract federal regulation like honey attracts bees.  As 
for the Bell companies, the main Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) 
providers, there was always the problem of providing a service that might 
cannibalize the industry’s most profitable service. 
But everyone was watching the wrong companies, for where 
broadband operators were timid, a company named Vonage was brave.  
In late 2003 Vonage leapfrogged the broadband operators and began 
selling VoIP directly to large volumes of customers.  Vonage did so not 
by cooperating with broadband operators but avoiding them.  It sold a 
plug-in device: an actual telephone that connects directly into the 
network and provided phone service for a fraction of the normal cost.  It 
is true that the quality of the Vonage connection was not, to a 
telecommunications engineer, strictly of the same quality as that available 
on a traditional phone network.  Yet Vonage’s quality was fine to an 
American people schooled by cell phones; its many users claim they 
cannot tell the difference.  Vonage, offered what everyone said no one 
would buy, and became the Internet’s success story of 2004.4 
The Vonage story captures much of the Openist’s vision of what the 
Internet revolution has meant for communications policy.  Without 
Vonage, VoIP would have arrived on the carrier’s schedule: later or 
perhaps never.  Vonage shows why Openists see the nation’s 
communications network important, first and foremost, as an innovation 
commons----a resource for innovators from anywhere to draw upon.5  The 
Openist credo is to care about the nation’s communications 
infrastructure, not so much of itself, but for how it catalyzes the nation’s 
economic and creative potential.  Vonage was free to enter the market 
with a new way of selling voice service only because the network is open, 
its standards as ‘‘free as the air to common use.’’ 
The Openist’s theory of an innovation commons can be broken into 
three prescriptive principles.  The first is the Infrastructure principle.  It 
is an insistence that the most important purpose of a communications 
network is as public infrastructure, with particular meaning attached to 
that concept.  It means that the principal value of the network is indirect: 
it as a source of positive spillovers, or externalities, that enable the work 
of others.  It suggests that the highest potential of the network will be 
achieved not by the accomplishments of network owners but by what 
creative users and developers can do with a fast and reliable connection 
 
 4. See Stephen Wildstrom, At Last, You Can Ditch The Phone Company VOIP Lets 
You Make Clear, Fast Calls Over The Net, Using A Plain Phone, BUS. WK., May 17, 2004, 
at 26. 
 5. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Internet Under Siege, FOREIGN POL’Y, Nov. 1, 
2001, available at http://www.lessig.org/content/columns/foreignpolicy1.pdf. 
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between every human on earth. 
One way of understanding this vision of the network as 
‘‘infrastructure’’ is to contrast it directly with its foil, the idea that a 
network is a ‘‘service’’ or ‘‘product’’ sold by a company.  At the podium at 
the 2004 Silicon Flatirons Conference, speaker Mark Cooper put this 
product / infrastructure distinction in vivid terms: 
The proprietary platform folks are talking about a BETA Max, an 
Atari and an Xbox; 
I am talking a general purpose technology, a cumulative, systemic 
technology, like the railroad, electricity or the telephone. 
For them the end-to-end principle is an obscure garden variety 
interface; 
For me it is a fundamental design principle of an enabling 
technology. 
When they analyze the proprietary standards wars, there are few if 
any externalities; 
When I analyze a bearer service like the digital communications 
platform, externalities dominate.6 
The second principle is the Neutrality principle. It holds that to 
reach its highest potential, a communications infrastructure must not 
discriminate as between uses, users, or content.  As FCC Commissioner 
Michael Copps puts it: ‘‘From its inception, the Internet was designed, as 
those present during the course of its creation will tell you, to prevent 
government or a corporation or anyone else from controlling it.  It was 
designed to defeat discrimination against users, ideas and technologies.’’7 
The third principle is the End-to-End (e2e) principle.  Whatever its 
meaning elsewhere,8 in broadband policy e2e stands for a theory of 
 
 6. Mark Cooper, Remarks at the Silicon Flatirons Telecommunications Program 
Conference, University of Colorado School of Law (Feb. 8, 2004) (transcript available from 
the Silicon Flatirons Telecommunications Program, http://www.silicon-flatirons.org) 
[hereinafter Cooper Remarks]. 
 7. See FCC Commissioner Michael J. Copps, The Beginning of the End of the 
Internet? Discrimination, Closed Networks, and the Future of Cyberspace, Address Before the 
New American Foundation (Oct. 9, 2003) (transcript available at 
http://www.newamerica.net/Download_Docs/pdfs/Docs_File_194_1.pdf). 
 8. In the telecommunications industry, the term ‘‘end-to-end’’ is used for a variety of 
purposes, many of which are quite meaningless, or roughly synonymous with ‘‘good.’’  See, e.g., 
MOTOROLA, INC., MOTOROLA NEXT LEVEL COMMUNICATIONS, END-TO-END, at 
http://broadband.motorola.com/nlc/solutions/endtoend.asp (last visited Jun. 26, 2004).  
Christopher Yoo, meanwhile, writes in this volume that the end-to-end principle as originally 
described by the network engineering literature has been misunderstood by Openists.  See 
Christopher S. Yoo, Would Mandating Broadband Network Neutrality Help or Hurt 
Competition?  A Comment on the End-to-End Debate, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH 
TECH. L. 23, 42-46 (2004). 
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innovation.  It rejects centralized, planned innovation, and holds that the 
greatest rate of technological development is driven by delegating 
decisional authority to the decentralized ‘‘ends’’ of any network.  The 
reason is fairly simple: the ‘‘ends’’ of the network are numerous, or nearly 
unlimited, and delegating authority to the ends opens the door to more 
approaches to a given technological challenge.  The e2e principle 
assumes that innovation is an evolutionary process, driven by contests 
between competing approaches to a problem.  For Openists, the e2e 
principle puts as many players in the contest as possible to ensure the true 
champion emerges. 
Openists believe these three principles are what made the Internet 
different from other communications networks; they hold that the 
embedding of these principles in the design of the Internet is the essence 
of the revolution. Their founder’s story rejects technological 
determinism, or the idea that the Internet was destined to occur.  They 
instead see the founding engineers, men like Paul Baran, Vint Cerf and 
Robert Kahn, as heroic figures and communications revolutionaries. 9 
The Openist vision just described can seem abstract to regulators 
and policy-makers.  For that reason, in recent years Openists have 
advanced a more concrete regulatory model to explain what neutrality 
would entail.  That model suggests that the Internet will continue its 
success if we come to understand it as a more humble but nonetheless 
highly successful innovation enhancing network: the nation’s electric 
grid. 
While today taken for granted, the electric network is probably the 
greatest innovation catalyst of our age.  The radio, the air conditioner, 
the computer and other giant innovations have all depended on a 
predictable and reliable supply of electric current.10  This multipurpose 
network is like the railways of the 19th century or the first roads of ages 
past: among the foundations of the national economy. 
Openists point to the electrical grid and say it is successful precisely 
because we don’t care about electricity as a product, but care instead 
about what the electric grid makes possible.  It provides a standardized 
platform for the development of appliances that serve human needs, such 
as the hair dryer or DVD player.  Sony and IBM do business safe in the 
assumption that American electricity will be predictable, standardized, 
and provided without preference for certain brands or products.  There is 
 
 9. An example of the heroic version of the Internet’s invention is KATIE HAFNER & 
MATTHEW LYON, WHERE WIZARDS STAY UP LATE, THE ORIGINS OF THE INTERNET 
(1996). 
 10. The electric grid model appears in Mark Cooper’s remarks at the Silicon Flatirons 
Conference.  See Cooper Remarks, supra note 6; Tim Wu, Application-Centered Internet 
Analysis, 85 VA. L. REV. 1163, 1165 (1999); see also LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND 
OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (2000). 
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no built-in favoritism for the VCR over the DVD player.  You do not 
ask the electric companies permission before plugging in a new cordless 
phone.  This makes the electric grid, Openists say, one of the greatest 
models of network neutrality the world has ever known. 
The electric grid model returns us to the Vonage story that opened 
the section.  The long term vision is a future where still other services 
long-centralized will finally be decentralized.  Freestanding IP-
televisions, IP-stereos, and many other services should be available based 
on plug-in devices, developed by independent, competing companies. 
This vision, in the Openists’ view, is far from inevitable. It requires 
defense of the network against forces that want, for a variety of reasons, 
to close the network to market entrants. 
B. The Deregulationists 
The contrasting vision of the communications future begins with 
the decades-old idea of media convergence.  Convergence means a 
natural technological progression toward a single network for 
communications services.  Voice, data, and video, historically carried over 
different networks will, in the future, be carried over a single ‘‘pipe.’’  
There was a time, namely the 1990s, when twin visions of ‘‘convergence’’ 
and ‘‘commons’’ could maintain a peaceful coexistence.  But today the 
visions are rivals, for the underlying principles are in conflict. 
The convergence vision focuses on the owners of the networks and 
the services they will offer on the converged network ‘‘telecosm.’’11 As 
Peter Huber puts it: 
Convergence among technologies is doing more than networking the 
networks.  It is transforming the services; the vast capacities of 
broadband networks make nonsense of the traditional regulation 
distinction between ‘‘carriers’’ and ‘‘broadcasters.’’ . . .  Broadcasters, in 
short, are mastering the art of keeping the ‘‘broad’’ while switching 
the ‘‘cast.’’  Telephone companies are keeping their switched, 
addressable capabilities while widening their bandwidth and their 
reach.  Nobody casts drift nets anymore.  They are all fly fishermen 
now.12 
The Deregulationist position can also be reduced to several principles.  
First is the Propertization principle: any given resource will generally 
reach its best use when mapped out as property, and assigned owners.  
When Deregulationists think ‘‘commons,’’ the word ‘‘tragedy’’ is never far 
 
 11. The idea of a ‘‘telecosm’’ was described most vividly in GEORGE GILDER, 
TELECOSM (2000). 
 12. PETER HUBER ET AL., FEDERAL BROADBAND LAW § 1.2.4 (1995). 
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from mind.  Property owners can be expected to maintain and steward 
only what they have the right to exclude others from.13 Additionally, the 
creation of transferable property rights will facilitate private, welfare-
enhancing transactions.  As Frank Easterbrook famously put it in 
Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse: ‘‘we need to bring the Internet 
into the world of property law . . . without which welfare-increasing 
bargains cannot occur.’’14 
The second principle is the Incentive principle, which is just a 
simple reminder that communications networks are expensive 
investments and that companies will only build when given the prospect 
of a reasonable return on investment.15  To speak, as Openists do, of a 
pure public infrastructure may have made some sense when the 
government was funding and building the network, but by now is 
seriously out-of-date. Some Deregulationists will accept that aspects of 
the Internet that have the character of a public good or natural monopoly 
and therefore might be best provided by an entity outside of the market 
(Internet addresses might be an example).  But in general, and for most 
of the network and its applications, the private sector responding to 
appropriate incentives will drive and fund the future. 
The final principle is Deregulation itself.  The Deregulationist is 
naturally suspicious of government regulation outside of the assignment 
of property rights.  This can be understood as a different interpretation 
of the Internet revolution: the greatest factor in the success of the 
Internet was the fact that the Commission and Congress largely stayed 
out of the way.  The idea of technological destinies, discussed above, is 
important to this position.  Deregulationists are generally technological 
realists, believing that power more than ideas determines the course of 
history.  Government may slow but it cannot stop the inevitable.  So 
while Openists may try to slow or stop it, in the long term the power of 
private network owners will drive the next-generation Internet. 
Much of this is as abstract as the idea of an Internet commons.  
When asked for a more concrete vision of what Deregulationist policies 
may lead to, Deregulationists have turned to the vision of the ‘‘smart 
pipe.’’  The smart pipe (also known as the ‘‘Quality of Service (QoS) 
Internet’’ or the ‘‘value-added service’’ model) is the central dogma of 
innumerable industry white papers.  The basic idea is this: broadband 
operators will increase revenue and profit by selling applications bundled 
 
 13. Cf. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). 
 14. Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL 
F. 207, 212-13 (1996). 
 15. See, e.g., ADAM D. THIERER, ‘‘NET NEUTRALITY’’ DIGITAL DISCRIMINATION 
OR REGULATORY GAMESMANSHIP IN CYBERSPACE? (The CATO Institute, CATO Policy 
Analysis No. 507, Jan. 12, 2004), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pa507.pdf. 
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with a basic connection.  Stated in industry jargon, broadband operators 
using ‘‘next-generation’’ technologies can offer their customers a host of 
‘‘value-added’’ services, such as telephony, video-on-demand, and so on.16  
The incentive for this new model, at least on the authority of projection, 
is profits that far exceed what can be earned from selling ‘‘commodity 
bandwidth.’’ 
Equipment vendors have pushed this vision aggressively for the last 
decade.  As a current Cisco White Paper instructs cable operators: 
Tomorrow’s cable business growth, however, will come from offering 
value-added services to consumers such as video on demand (VOD), 
interactive TV, and cable telephony.17 
How? As Cisco explains to cable operators, in a FAQ rich with industry 
jargon: 
The Cisco MSOC solution defines a multiservice network 
infrastructure for delivering HFC-based, revenue generating 
enhanced IP-based services. Cisco MSOC provides best-practice 
design guidelines for building a well-engineered, reliable, highly 
available and quality-of-service (QoS)-enabled cable network capable 
of supporting real-time sensitive applications (such as VoIP and 
commercial services). . . . The largely untapped market for enhanced 
IP-based services, beyond high-speed Internet, will primarily fuel the 
future revenue growth for the cable operators.18 
In short, the vendor industry and Deregulationists predict that the next 
great wave of innovation will occur at the center of the network, not the 
ends.19  That directly contradicts the end-to-end principle, but that’s 
fine: most Deregulationists believe blind adherence to the end-to-end 
principle is what is in fact slowing technological progress today.  
Economists Bruce Owen and Gregory Rosston, for example, argue that 
‘‘openness inevitably has a price,’’ and that certain innovations ‘‘have been 
 
 16. See, e.g., Ira Brodsky, Telecom Carriers Need to Smarter Up Their Pipes, 
NETWORK WORLD FUSION, (Jan. 15, 2001), at http://www.nwfusion.com/columnists/ 
2001/00280817.html. 
 17. CISCO SYSTEMS, RESIDENTIAL CABLE SERVICES (2003), available at 
http://www.cisco.com/application/pdf/en/us/guest/netsol/ns289/c714/ccmigration_09186a008
014e05f.pdf. 
 18. CISCO SYSTEMS, MULTISYSTEM OVER CABLE SOLUTIONS (2003), available at 
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/netsol/ns341/ns396/ns289/ns269/netqa09186a0080113708.htm
l. 
 19. See, e.g., BRUCE OWEN & GREGORY ROSSTON, LOCAL BROADBAND ACCESS: 
PRIMUM NON NOCERE OR PRIMUM PROCESSI? A PROPERTY RIGHTS APPROACH 21 
(STAN. L. & ECON., Olin Working Paper No. 263, 2003), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=431620. 
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slowed or even blocked because of the [e2e’s] requirement that the 
network not have embedded intelligence.’’20 
Finally, while Openists favor the story of the Internet founders, 
Deregulationists invoke a different prescriptive saga: the birth of cable 
television.  As Peter Huber puts it ‘‘Cable was the prototype of the 
broadband future.’’21  The development of the cable networks was a story 
of private ingenuity’s victory over governmental perfidy and, in the mind 
of many Deregulationists, a story with clear lessons for broadband 2000. 
The Commission in the 1960s was anxious to preserve certain ideal 
visions of television.  The two most important were that it be free and 
that it be local.  Whatever the theoretical merits of those views, 
Deregulationists point out that the practical effect was to slow the spread 
of cable television for a full decade and to stop it from penetrating urban 
markets.22  It was only by the 1970s that the Commission finally relaxed 
its grip and let competitive forces run their course.  (Today cable 
companies are the TV’s dominant players, so much so that cable 
operators rather casually bid to acquire broadcasters, their one-time 
overlords.)23 
This, the Deregulationists would suggest, is what’s happening in 
broadband policy, though our proximity makes us incapable of realizing 
it.  There are certain parallels that anchor the obstructionist story.  First, 
physical broadband networks, whether cable, twisted pair, or wireless 
spectrum, are indeed the subject of intensely complex federal and state 
regulation, rather like those to which the cable industry was subjected in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s (one writer described the cable regulations 
of 1972 as the ‘‘most complicated scheme ever devised by the mind of 
man’’24).  The ongoing regulatory asymmetry of DSL, cable, and wireless 
services is perhaps the most obvious example of a governmentally 
introduced distortion. 
Second, the Commission in this view is still attached to some 
inappropriately utopian visions, which do not correspond with 
technological destiny.  Today, the Deregulationist would contend, 
replacing ‘‘localism’’ and ‘‘free television’’ are similarly impractical ideals 
 
 20. Id. at 21. 
 21. PETER HUBER, LAW AND DISORDER IN CYBERSPACE 62 (1997). 
 22. See Leonard Chazen & Leonard Ross, Federal Regulation of Cable Television, the 
Visible Hand, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1820, 1820 (1970); Stanley M. Besen & Robert W. 
Crandall, The Deregulation of Cable Television, 4 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 77, 94 (1981) 
(‘‘Cable entered the 1970s as a small business relegated primarily to rural areas and small 
communities and held hostage by television broadcasters to the Commission’s hope for the 
development of UHF.’’). 
 23. See Alison Beard, Comcast Must Spell Out Plan for ABC, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 17, 
2004, available at 2004 WL 70205529 (discussing Comcast’s planned acquisition of ABC). 
 24. Besen & Crandall, supra note 22, at 81-91 (documenting FCC activity constraining 
the growth of cable). 
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like the ‘‘end-to-end principle,’’ ‘‘open access’’ and, of course ‘‘network 
neutrality.’’ 
A related similarity is what Deregulationists decry as an effort to 
prop up doomed businesses in the name of lofty ideals.  In the 1960s, the 
Commission placed much hope for the future of television in a new 
generation of UHF broadcast stations.25  UHF stations did have many 
appealing qualities: they were locally owned, free over the air for 
recipients, and available in greater quantity than VHF stations.  But 
UHF was hopeless as a technological competitor to cable.  Today, 
Deregulationists contend, we see the scenario repeating itself.  
Independent Internet Service Providers (ISPs) are kept alive in the vain 
hope that they may somehow make the broadband world a better place. 
So what is the Deregulationist’s vision of the future?  Some argue 
that the FCC and Internet old-timers are holding back, not promoting 
the natural progress of broadband networks.  Innovation, they contend, 
can happen anywhere, not just at the ‘‘ends.’’  Dreams of a neutral 
network may be holding back the next communications revolution, one 
that will arise from the center of the network.  That vision will 
necessarily be driven by private network owners and will bring consumers 
both what they want and are willing to pay for and what the old Internet 




It is between substantive visions of the future where the Openist -- 
Deregulationist divide is most stark.  That is perhaps because the 
contrasting utopias depend mainly on intuition and aesthetics, and faith 
in the private and public sectors, respectively.  Yet nonetheless the sides 
are not precise opponents.  Openists are primarily focused on the ends----
the innovation commons.  Deregulations care most about the means, 
most of all wanting to prevent disastrous and long-lasting governmental 
intervention.  There is room, in other words, for reconciliation. 
 
 25. This was one of the arguments of the 1958 Cox Report.  Kenneth Cox, The Problem 
of Television Service for Smaller Communities. Staff Report to the Senate Committee on 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 26 December 1958. 
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II. SHARED ECONOMIC FAITHS 
A. Schumpeter 
It is worth reemphasizing that the greatest unifying belief as 
between the Openist and Deregulationist is a common idolization of 
innovation. Both sides, with a few exceptions,26 worship at the shrine of 
economist Joseph Schumpeter and admire his concept of innovation as 
‘‘creative destruction.’’27 
The core of what is agreed upon can be stated simply.  Both sides 
take innovation, and not price competition, as the principle driver of 
economic growth.  Proximity to the industries of high technology leads 
naturally to favoring or at least acknowledging what economists call 
‘‘dynamic’’ economic models.  Both the Openists and Deregulatists do 
not believe that reaching market equilibrium is a particularly attractive 
ideal: instead, new companies, new services and new products are the 
primary source of increased efficiency and economic growth. That belief, 
for both sides, put innovation policy at the center of national economic 
policy. 
How, then, does innovation happen?  As Schumpeter said, 
‘‘Creative Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism.’’28 
Schumpeter’s ‘‘capitalist’’ or ‘‘competitive’’ theory of innovation is 
centered on the ‘‘process of industrial mutation . . . that incessantly 
revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying 
the old one, incessantly creating a new one.’’  Both sides also agree with 
Schumpeter that the greatest barrier to innovation is ‘‘ordinary routine.’’ 
As he put it ‘‘knowledge and habit once acquired becomes as firmly 
rooted in ourselves as a railway embankment in the earth.’’29  As a result, 
even ‘‘in the breast of one who wishes to do something new, the forces of 
habit raise up and bear witness against the embryonic project.’’  The 
 
 26. There is a dissenting Openist viewpoint that sees the value of open infrastructure 
primarily in terms of providing positive social externalities as opposed to for its role in spurring 
innovation.  (We value open parks for walking and socializing, not because they lead to new 
inventions----the same should go for the Internet).  This view is well expressed in Brett M. 
Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Sustainable Infrastructure Commons 
(2004) (working manuscript, on file with author). 
 27. Much as Schumpeter admired Karl Marx. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, 
CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 61 (1950) [hereinafter SCHUMPETER, 
CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY] (‘‘Can capitalism survive?  No.  I do not 
think it can’’).  Most of his account of capitalism as a system of growth through innovation as 
opposed to price competition is summarized in Ch. VII. Id. 
 28. Id. at 83. 
 29. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, A THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 84 (1961) 
[hereinafter SCHUMPETER, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT]. 
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greatest threat is social resistance, particularly from ‘‘the groups 
threatened by the innovation.’’30 
As I said, most Openists and Deregulationists consider themselves 
Schumpeterians.  With all this agreement, where do the differences 
arise?  The difference between Openists and Deregulationists in 
Schumpeterian terms is over who the agents of creative destruction are.  
It boils down to something quite simple: the two sides have different 
attitudes toward size.  Many Deregulationists, like the later Schumpeter, 
see large and powerful companies as the central agents of creative 
destruction.  Big firms are the winners, the success stories, the smartest 
and strongest.  For the Openists, conversely, size is not necessarily a sign 
of continuing success but instead suggestive of some knack for blocking 
market entry.  The Openists like the early Schumpeter, and his younger 
focus on the entrepreneur as the seed of creative destructive.  The 
difference in opinion over size can be as intractable as how one sees Sport 
Utility Vehicles or modern skyscrapers.  Some see a mighty work of man, 
others see a wasteful monster.  Yet since Schumpeter himself managed to 
reconcile the role of large and small in his work, it ought be possible for 
his latter-day followers. 
First, the vision of the Deregulationists’ Schumpeter:  ‘‘What we 
have got to accept’’ said Schumpeter in 1943, is that the ‘‘large-scale 
establishment’’ is ‘‘the most powerful engine of [economic] progress and 
in particular of the long-run expansion of total output.’’31  Putting faith in 
‘‘perfect competition’’ among numerous competitors was, in his view, 
folly, for ‘‘the firm of the type that is compatible with perfect competition 
is in many cases inferior in internal, especially technological, efficiency.’’32 
The reasons for this belief can be specified more carefully.  First, in 
a dynamic market, when a firm successfully establishes a new market 
through product innovation, the result is inevitably at least a short-term 
market advantage, even a monopoly.  Yet that market power is no cause 
for concern, as it will erode quickly under the pressure of capitalistic 
competition.  Indeed, short-term monopoly profits are not a social ill but 
rather social boon.  For it is the very existence of potential monopoly 
profit that fires the pistons of creative destruction.  It is only the 
possibility of a giant and seemingly unfair payoff that motivates risky and 
otherwise irrational innovative behavior.  Under Capitalism, Schumpeter 
said, ‘‘spectacular prizes much greater than would have been necessary to 
call forth the particular effort are thrown to a small minority of winners, 
 
 30. Id. 
 31. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM & DEMOCRACY, supra note 27, at 106. 
 32. Id. 
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thus propelling much more effaciously than a more equal and more ‘just’ 
distribution would.’’33 
Second, large, powerful firms have advantages that in this view 
make them the only entities truly capable of producing meaningful 
progress.  One idea, not strictly Schumpeterian, is that the large firm 
with a secure market may carry out product innovation in a planned and 
careful way, and decrease the waste from competing innovative 
processes.34  Another idea from Schumpeter is that large firms are simply 
smarter, stronger, and better.  Schumpeter argued that ‘‘there are superior 
methods available to the monopolist,’’ and that ‘‘monopolization may 
increase the sphere of influence of the better, and decrease the sphere of 
influence of inferior brains.’’35 
In the broadband context, this vision sees the great firms----mainly, 
the greatest of cable operators and powerful Bell Operating 
Companies----as the agents of perpetual revolution.  Their battle for the 
giant profits that await the champion, the single broadband monopolist, 
are the driving force behind broadband innovation and the future of the 
Internet. 
The Openists reject or temper this ‘‘naive’’ faith in great firms, both 
with the work of Schumpeter himself, and that of later evolutionary 
economists.  Consider first the early, German-language Schumpeter who 
spent his time on individual entrepreneurs, and the challenges they face.36 
Openists think that many have misunderstood Schumpeter: that he 
didn’t truly believe that the large firm had an inherent advantage over the 
small firm.  As economist Jan Farberberg argues, ‘‘In fact, Schumpeter 
seemed to be much more concerned with the difference between new and 
old firms than between small and large firms.’’37  Meanwhile, the early 
Schumpeter’s theory of entrepreneurs is distinct and compelling.  They 
are to him unusual characters, risk-seeking individuals with a ‘‘special 
quality,’’ who are spread through the population like undercover 
superheroes.  What distinguished this class of individuals, said 
Schumpeter (foreshadowing the ‘‘open source’’ movement), was that 
profit would be but one motive and not the most important one.  
Instead, the entrepreneur was generally driven by ‘‘the dream or will to 
 
 33. Id. 
 34. Cf. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & 
ECON. 265 (1977). 
 35. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM & DEMOCRACY, supra note 27, at 101 
 36. See SCHUMPETER, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 29. 
 37. JAN FAGERBERG, A LAYMAN’S GUIDE TO EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMICS 15 
(Centre for Technology, Innovation and Culture, Oslo, TIK Working Paper, Sept. 2002), 
available at http://folk.uio.no/janf/downloadp/02fagerberg_evolution.pdf. 
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found a private kingdom;’’ ‘‘the will to conquer: the impulse to fight, to 
prove oneself superior to others’’ and finally the ‘‘joy of creating.’’38 
The Openist also directs those of Schumpeterian faith to the work 
of recent evolutionary economists like Richard Nelson and Sidney 
Winter.  An essential element of such neo-Schumpeterian work is the 
emphasis on the uncertainty and contingency and of technological 
outcomes.  It predicts multiple possible equilibria, rather than a single, 
predictable outcome.  One reason is that this branch of economic 
thinking takes a much more sophisticated view of how firms decide what 
to do, rejecting the premise that firms will generally arrive at 
‘‘maximizing’’ decisions.39  Firms instead generally depend on a set of 
routines that survive unless the firm dies or manages to mutate its way of 
doing business.  This latter capacity is limited by the limits of humans’ 
ability to predict or foresee the future.  There is, for writers such as 
Nelson, simply too much information to process: firms will usually lack 
the capacity to understand it all and understand what routines it needs to 
change to arrive at the best of all possible worlds.  The odds, then, of any 
single actor treading the optimal path of technological development are 
exceedingly low. 
When cognitive limitations combine with the phenomenon, in at 
least some markets, of path dependence (that is, technological ‘‘lock-in,’’ 
or ‘‘network externalities’’),40 then reaching suboptimal technological 
outcomes is not only possible but likely.  Evolutionists, pace Dilbert, 
consider firms to be unimaginative creatures whose ideas of the future 
tends to be closely tied to the present, like the 19th century farmer who 
asks for a better ox instead of a tractor.  The ‘‘network’’ benefits of doing 
business in accord with the way everyone else does it adds to the 
problem.  The result can quite easily become technological complacency, 
the graveyard of economic growth. 
Here lies the link between neo-Schumpeterian economics and the 
e2e principle described in the opening section.  The e2e principle can be 
understood as the implementation of an evolutionary innovation policy.  
E2e mandates that innovation is the job of the many (the ends), not the 
few (the center).  By prescribing non-discrimination, it also sets 
conditions necessary for a fair fight, so that what survives is the truly the 
fittest and not merely the favored.  E2e can help erase through 
 
 38. SCHUMPETER, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 29, at 93. 
 39. See, e.g., RICHARD NELSON & SIDNEY WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 
OF ECONOMIC CHANGE 14 (1982) (‘‘we reject the notion of maximizing behavior as an 
explanation of why decision rules are what they are’’). 
 40. See generally W. BRIAN ARTHUR, INCREASING RETURNS AND PATH 
DEPENDENCY IN THE ECONOMY (1994). 
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competition the invariable mistakes that a centralized network planner 
will make. 
This hostility toward centralized, planned innovation should, for 
Openists in particular, spill over to an attitude toward government.  
Government, no more than any human entity, is likely to have a good 
idea of what the future should be, so centralized technological planning 
is no better option. But the developments in evolutionary economics and 
post-Schumpeterian thought should direct Deregulationists to rethink 
their argument.  It cannot be denied that the unregulated companies 
favored by the deregulation can become among the forces that resist the 
new.  The new work suggests that this is not only possible, but likely. 
All of these teachings lead to a single principle that should be an 
absolute policy consensus.  Lost-cost market entry is the common 
foundation of the innovation theories that both Deregulationists and 
Openists subscribe to. That means preventing any single actor, 
governmental or otherwise, from becoming lord of the technological 
future.  A multiplicity of innovating actors, even if suffering from the 
same inability to accurately predict the future, may nonetheless stumble 
upon the optimal path.  But all should understand that the process will 
be an ugly, Darwinian affair, an interminable exercise in trial and error, 
and not the well-calculated elegance of monopolistic prophecy. 
B.  Vertical Integration & New Institutional Economics 
While the study of vertical integration may seem to be a technical 
topic, it has become central to understanding the division between 
Openists and Deregulationists, and what the possibilities for 
reconciliation are.41  For the work in this area proposes that the ends 
favored by Openists----namely, the innovations commons----may be 
reached by Deregulationist means.  The analysis of vertical integration 
has highlighted weaknesses in the Openist position.  Strong opposition 
to all vertical integration, expressed in the ‘‘open access’’ laws, has failed 
to answer to the challenge implicit in examples of ‘‘good’’ vertical 
coordination. 
Why pay any attention to vertical integration at all?  The specific 
reason is the ‘‘open access’’ debate.  Some Openists, early on, suggested 
that the best means of preventing an erosion of the neutrality of the 
network would be laws limiting vertical integration of broadband carriers 
with Internet service providers.  Keeping these two economic units 
separate, suggested Lawrence Lessig and Mark Lemley in early work, is 
 
 41. A far better overview of this aspect of the debate is provided by Joseph Farrell & 
Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open Access Policies: Towards a 
Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85 
(2003). 
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likely to prevent content discrimination on the Internet.42  The counter-
argument is by now familiar for those who follow the debate.  First, as 
Phil Weiser and Joseph Farrell reminded, vertical integration often leads 
to important efficiencies.43  Second, as Jim Speta and others have pointed 
out, broadband operators, even if vertically integrated, want to make 
their product as valuable as possible and can therefore be expected to 
provide their customers with wide access to content and services.44  
Weiser and Farrell express this as the ‘‘ICE presumption,’’ a presumption 
that a platform monopolist will ‘‘internalize complementary 
externalities.’’45 
The literature has focused on a narrow but crucial question: how 
likely is it that private firms will create an innovation commons when 
that would be economically desirable?  The answer begins by recognizing 
that the value of a broadband operator’s (or any platform owner’s) service 
ultimately depends on what applications and content it supports.  The 
value of a game console to a consumer is chiefly a function of the games 
you can play on it (imagine an advanced game console that offered only 
‘‘Pong’’).  We ought therefore expect the broadband operator to do 
everything possible to maximize the platform’s value to its customers, 
including the adoption of whatever strategies will lead to the best 
environment for developing applications.  For example, a service that 
only allowed Comcast customers to email Comcast customers would be 
less valuable, making it unlikely that Comcast would impose such a 
limitation.  Similarly, if an ‘‘open’’ application development model yields 
the best applications, then the platform owner will provide an open 
model. 
There may also be services where vertically coordinated, ‘‘hand-in-
glove’’ cooperation results in more value for the customer.  A car that 
arrived with no speedometer or tachometer would be less desirable 
despite the fact that the automobile and gauge market are arguably 
separate.  In the broadband context, Comcast might, for example, want 
to offer its customers an integrated Voice-over-cable product.  Doing so 
might be better with vertical coordination between itself and a telephony 
carrier.  In short, some applications are better provided in a closed 
fashion, and some open.  What is better open and better closed is 
 
 42. See Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the 
Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925 (2001). 
 43. See Farrell & Weiser, supra note 41, at 100-05. 
 44. See James B. Speta, A Vision of Openness by Government Fiat, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 
1553, 1565-66 (2001); James B. Speta, Handicapping the Race for the Last Mile?  A Critique 
of Open Access Rules for Broadband Platforms, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 39 (2000). 
 45. See Farrell & Weiser, supra note 41, at 101. 
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ultimately an empirical question,46 and one that the platform owner----the 
argument goes----is best situated to answer. 
But hold on: what if the platform owner is a monopolist----won’t it 
try to ‘‘leverage’’ its platform monopoly into a second monopoly?  For 
example, might a monopolist broadband operator begin to try and give 
itself a monopoly over all Voice-over-IP revenue?  Here, for a 
Deregulationist, the relevance of the ‘‘single-monopoly profit’’ principles 
emerges.  To a platform monopolist, the applications are its inputs, and 
the monopolist has the same interest as any other party in minimizing its 
input costs.47  Hence, if allowing open application development saves the 
monopolist money, then it will do so.  An example comes from 
Microsoft, monopoly owner of the Windows platform.  Microsoft does 
not categorically bar any foreign applications, but instead integrates some 
functions into the operating system platform (such as, say, disk 
defragmentation utilities), and leaves others open to some degree of 
competition (such as word processors).  While the merits of Microsoft as 
a model are debatable, the point is that even a monopoly platform owner 
may find it a bad idea to make everything vertically integrated. 
This analysis leads to a presumption that, in the 
telecommunications market, vertically integrated companies, even with 
monopoly power, should generally be left unregulated, absent special 
conditions, or exceptions.48 
But from both Weiser and Farrell’s work, and from the evolutionary 
economic work discussed above, there is an important reason to suspect 
that platform owners may not implement optimal innovation policies 
themselves.  Weiser and Farrell call it the problem of ‘‘incompetent 
incumbents.’’49  In the terminology of Nelson and Winter, it is the 
observations that firms operate on the basis of routines that do not allow 
for suitable decisional flexibility.  Perhaps most simply: the clearest 
problem is that no company will plan its own death, even if its death is in 
the social interest. 
The problem for policy-makers is this: when a platform owner 
chooses a closed system, how can we know whether is it actually trying to 
‘‘internalize complementary externalities’’ or just trying to protect itself?  
Is the platform owner truly creating a better product (like a car that 
 
 46. Cf. Douglas Lichtman, Property Rights in Emerging Platform Technologies, 29 J. 
LEGAL STUDIES 615 (2000) (describing certain situations in which a platform owner might 
choose an open platform). 
 47. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 177--78 (2d ed. 2001). 
 48. Farrell and Weiser provide a useful summary of the exceptions that have emerged 
from the economic literature.  Two are particularly relevant to the broadband context (1) 
interests in price discrimination and, (2) interests in disadvantaging potential platform rivals.  
See Farrell & Weiser, supra note 41, at 105-19. 
 49. Id. at 114-17. 
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includes a speedometer) or is it, in Schumpeter’s phraseology, ‘‘resisting 
to new ways’’ in an effort to prevent its own inevitable demise?50  
Effective competition will threaten the life of existing firms.  As 
Schumpeter put it, in a true capitalist system, companies face 
‘‘competition which commands a decisive cost or quality advantage and 
which strikes not at the margins of the profits and the outputs of the 
existing firms but at their foundations and their very lives.’’51  If 
innovation presents a firm with a threat to its very existence, then its 
interest in a closed system may have much less to do with ‘‘internalization 
of complementary externalities’’ than it does with basic survival. 
For policy-makers, the best answer to this dilemma, I believe, 
combines a program of education and regulatory threat.  It is reasonable 
to agree that certain applications may be more efficiently provided open 
and others closed, and still see industry education as the primary 
challenge.  Policy makers should be suspicious of the premise that 
internal processes of firm-decision will always or even often lead to good 
decisions.  There are many reasons, not all of which can be discussed 
here, but one is that the information and signals that broadband 
operators are exposed to can be biased.  Equipment vendors have spent 
years convincing broadband operators that great profits lie in capturing 
the applications market for themselves.  In my personal experience, Wall 
Street analysts reward broadband operators in the short term for 
announcing plans to move into the applications market without serious 
analysis of the second-monopoly profit problem.  Neither group has 
much to lose from sending such messages but both operators and 
consumers do.  A vivid example came in 2000, when broadband operator 
Enron announced bold moves into the Video-on-Demand market and 
was cheered by financial and industry analysts (though obviously 
punished later).52  In that case, the problem was not quite that the 
operator did not understand the one monopoly profit rule; it seemed to 
be that analysts did not seem to care. 
This view sees industry education as paramount.  One important 
tool in this respect is the regulatory threat, which can be important as a 
kind of signaling tool.53 It can counteract information broadband 
operators get from other sources.  Notably, FCC Chairman Michael 
Powell has taken steps toward such an educational policy.  Powell has 
encouraged broadband owners to guarantee the neutrality of the network 
 
 50. SCHUMPETER, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 29, at 86. 
 51. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM & DEMOCRACY, supra note 27, at 84. 
 52. See Cecily Barnes, Blockbuster Tests Video Streaming, CNET NEWS.COM (Dec. 19, 
2000) at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-250126.html. 
 53. See Wu, supra note 2 (suggesting regulatory threat may force operators to consider 
the value of openness). 
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for their own sake as well as for that of consumers.  His approach 
challenges operators to respect four ‘‘Internet freedoms’’ of the Internet 
consumer to guarantee a better network for all.54  This message, if it 
reaches operators, may balance the urgings of others, such as equipment 
vendors and sometimes Wall Street, to seek a (unachievable) second 
monopoly profit. 
III. RECONCILIATION 
In what is perhaps an excess of optimism I consider reconciliation 
plausible.  As the discussion above suggests, the insights of the Openists 
and Deregulationists are not necessarily in tension.  Consider that both 
sides are basically interested in innovation and open market entry.  The 
Openists are principally concerned with ends (an open network), and the 
Deregulationists, means (non-governmental methods).  That suggests 
room for agreement. 
A.  Network Neutrality and the Model of Users’ Rights 
Based on the positions developed here, I believe neither 
Deregulationists nor Openists should oppose well-drafted Network 
Neutrality (NN) rules.  Such NN rules are, ideally, users’ rights to use the 
equipment or attachments that they want, following directly the open, 
deregulatory spirit of Hush-A-Phone.  Neither side should have much 
reason to oppose a rule that creates a right of users to use whatever legal 
and non-harmful application ‘‘attachments’’ they want.  NN rules, stated 
otherwise, can do much to advance the joint Schumpeterian interest in 
wide-open market entry. 
NN rules are distinguished by creating rights in users.  Rights, that 
is, to attach equipment or access any application or content, so long as it 
is not harmful or illegal.  As a recent proposed rule reads: 
(b) General Right of Unrestricted Network Usage.  Broadband Users 
have the right to use their Internet connection in ways which not 
unlawful or harmful to the network. Accordingly neither Broadband 
Operators nor the Federal Communications Commission shall 
impose restrictions on the use of an Internet connection except as 
necessary to: [prevent uses illegal under statute or uses harmful to the 
network].55 
 
 54. See Michael K. Powell, Preserving Internet Freedom: Guiding Principles For The 
Industry, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 5 (2004). 
 55. See Appendix A.  This is the most recent version of regulations first proposed in an 
ex parte submission to the FCC by Tim Wu and Lawrence Lessig.  See Tim Wu & Lawrence 
Lessig Ex Parte Letter, Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the 
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This distinguishes NN rules from competitor-centered rules like the 
various state-law ‘‘open access’’ regimes, or the approach of § 251 of the 
1996 Telecommunications Act.56  For example, the Portland merger 
condition at issue in the original AT&T open access case creates rights 
in ISPs, not users.57 
The attraction to Openists of an NN rule is perhaps more intuitive.  
What is the attraction to Deregulationists?  The key point is that 
creating rights in users can and will serve deregulatory purposes.  
American law is full of such deregulatory rights, economic and otherwise.  
A good example is the rights created by the dormant commerce clause to 
be free from discriminatory state regulation.58  A user-centered NN rule 
is as deregulatory in spirit as Hush-A-Phone and Carter-Phone59 were.  
It prevents government from acting as in the Hush-A-Phone case and 
agreeing to regulations that block application or network attachment.  
While less likely in recent years than in the 1950s and 1960s, the 
possibility of such action should not be discounted, for the reasons for 
doing so in the future cannot be predicted today.  NN rules are, in short, 
like other rights against government: a form of pre-commitment rule for 
both government and industry.  They prevent now what may be 
temptations tomorrow. 
In addition, the broadband industry and some Deregulationists may 
be overlooking the extent to which NN rules prevent government from 
blocking operator entry into the application market.  If the users have the 
right to access lawful applications and content, that includes those 
provided by the operator itself.  NN rules prevent a quarantine----prevent 
operators from offering competitive, vertically integrated applications 
themselves.  NN rules for these reasons have a value to the operator 
industry that should not be minimized. 
Finally, NN rules are, at bottom, rules designed to free market 
entry, and should therefore be supported by those with Schumpeterian 
leanings, which means nearly everyone in communications policy.  The 
NN rules create a structural bias that favors entry of any player, operator 
or application, or equipment-developer, into the market for consumer 
usage of the Internet.  They are designed to make the Vonage story 
repeat itself.  Even if Vonage dies, the Schumpeterian will admit it will 
have succeeded in bringing the network forward.  The NN rules also do 
 
Internet Over Cable Facilities, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC CS Docket No. 02-52 
(filed Aug. 22, 2003), available at http://faculty.virginia.edu/timwu/wu_lessig_fcc.pdf. 
 56. 47 U.S.C. § 252 (2000). 
 57. AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 58. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981) (discussing 
the rights created by the dormant commerce clause). 
 59. See Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Tel. Serv., Decision, 13 F.C.C.2d 
420 (1968). 
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not (as Christopher Yoo argues, discussed below) do anything in 
particular to prevent ‘‘facilities-based’’ entry.  If anyone thinks they have a 
better idea than the TCP/IP protocol, they are free to build that network 
and see how it goes. 
One Deregulationist who has not overlooked these arguments and 
the desirability of NN principles is FCC Chairman Michael Powell.  
Powell has spoken powerfully on the normative desirability of ‘‘Internet 
freedom,’’ his phrase for network neutrality. ‘‘Internet freedom,’’ he says, 
means ‘‘ensuring that consumers can obtain and use the content, 
applications and devices they want.’’60  Doing so, he says, is ‘‘critical to 
unlocking the vast potential of the broadband Internet,’’ and (in 
Schumpeterian language), ‘‘essential to nurturing competitive 
innovation.’’ 
Powell’s discussion of ‘‘Internet freedom’’ focuses also on users’ 
rights, notably, the four ‘‘freedoms’’ are: 
Freedom to Access Content. First, I believe consumers should have 
their choice of legal content. 
. . . . 
Freedom to Use Applications. Second, consumers should be able to 
run applications of their choice. 
. . . . 
Freedom to Attach Personal Devices. Third, consumers should be 
permitted to attach personal devices they choose to be the 
connections that they pay for in their homes. 
. . . . 
Freedom to Obtain Service Plan Information. Finally, and most 
importantly, consumers must receive clear and meaningful 
information regarding their service plans and what the limits of those 
plans are.61 
These principles advocated by Powell, while done as part of an 
educational campaign, underline why Openists and Deregulationists 
should find common ground in advocacy in user-centered network 
neutrality rules.  A shared faith in consumer choice and open market 
entry augurs such a result. 
 
 60. Powell, supra note 54, at 12. 
 61. Id. 
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B.  Criticism of Network Neutrality 
While some Deregulationists, like Chairman Powell, have endorsed 
principles of network neutrality, many industry players and some 
Deregulationists have mounted challenges to network neutrality 
proposals.  I suggest that these challenges are generally lacking in merit, 
for reasons that follow. 
The industry’s most common challenge is this: while neutrality 
might be an attractive goal, any neutrality regulation is a solution looking 
for a problem.  Such regulation or even a threat thereof, violates the 
principle of Primum Non Nocere (first, do no harm).62  At its worst, 
network neutrality regulation might become a tool in the hands of 
application developers used to block competition from broadband 
operators.  Imagine, for example, a rule that required FCC permission 
before a broadband operator could offer any service beyond a basic 
connection. 
There are several problems with the Primum Non Nocere objection.  
First, it simply raises a question of dueling baselines.  The existing design 
of the Internet is neutral.  Why should it not be private entities who 
follow the principle of ‘‘do no harm’’ before monkeying with the proven 
strengths of the existing design?  In this sense the slogan does nothing 
but restate an underlying difference in visions. 
Second, the objection relies on an anti-regulatory straw-man.  
Because it is possible to imagine a bad network neutrality law, any 
network neutrality regulation is suspect.  Yet it is unclear how Chairman 
Powell’s or other’s suggestions create the means for preventing 
competition among applications.  The cable industry, the leading 
exponent of the do-no-harm view, has very meager support for its claim 
that a NN rule would block operator entry into the applications market.  
Its sole support is a proposal from Amazon that could be read to bar 
cable-operators from adding pop-up ads to web content.63  That’s far 
from a rule that prevents operators from entering the applications 
market. And as discussed above, a NN-rule that creates user’s rights will 
give operators as much as anyone else a right to enter the applications or 
equipment markets. 
A more powerful challenge to network neutrality rules runs as 
follows.  It may be true that the basic, neutral Internet creates positive 
externalities, like the electrical grid or other neutral networks.  But the 
metaphor is inapt for the following reason: the electric grid model fails to 
 
 62. See Owen & Rosston, supra note 19. 
 63. See National Cable and Telecommunications Association Ex Parte Letter, 
Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Cable 
Facilities, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC CS Docket No. 02-52 (filed Feb. 21, 2003). 
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take into account the possible need to improve the grid or infrastructure 
itself and the creation of proper incentives to do so.  As Howard 
Shelanski puts the point, using roads as a metaphor: ‘‘at some point the 
road needs to be improved and that work can be disruptive.  So the 
question is not one of never disrupting the flow of traffic, but of knowing 
when to let cars run freely on the road and when to tear up the road to 
make it work better.’’64 
This returns us to the ‘‘smart-pipe’’ discussion and the argument 
that much innovative potential is trapped in the core of the network, a 
point Christopher Yoo makes.65 Yoo argues that it is critical, in a market 
with many vertical layers, that competition be encouraged at the layer 
that is least competitive.  As he states, ‘‘Application of the basic insights 
of vertical integration theory reveals that markets will achieve economic 
efficiency only if each stage of production is competitive.’’66  Looking at 
broadband, he thinks that in the application and content market, 
competition is robust and needs no favors.  Yet he sees competition at 
the physical layer (between cable and DSL) least vigorous and therefore 
the most in need of freedom from government restraints.  Network 
neutrality regulation, in Yoo’s view, would mandate dumbness and 
therefore slow deployment of proprietary ‘‘smart’’ networks.67 
According to Yoo, the answer is to allow or even encourage the 
deployment of divergent proprietary, as opposed to standardized, 
broadband networks.  He sketches the possibility of consumers being 
served by three entirely different and non-standardized broadband 
infrastructures: ‘‘The first network could be optimized for conventional 
Internet applications, such as e-mail and website access. The second 
network could incorporate security features designed to appeal to users 
focusing on e-commerce. The third network could prioritize packet 
routing in the manner needed to facilitate time-sensitive applications 
such as VoIP.’’ 
Yoo’s conclusions are overstated and demand several responses.  
First, it is unclear why Yoo believes that the existence of a neutral 
Internet would be a barrier to ‘‘facilities-based competition,’’ that is, the 
market entry of entirely new network facilities.68  If an operator wanted 
 
 64. Howard Shelanski, Remarks at Silicon Flatirons Telecommunications Program 
Conference, University of Colorado School of Law (Feb. 8, 2004) (transcript available from 
the Silicon Flatirons Telecommunications Program, http://www.silicon-flatirons.org). 
 65. Yoo, supra note 8, at 42-46. 
 66. Id. at 59. 
 67. Adam D. Thierer makes the same point.  See Adam D. Thierer, Are ‘Dumb Pipe’ 
Mandates Smart Public Policy? Vertical Integration, ‘Net Neutrality,’ and the Network Layers 
Model, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. (forthcoming Winter 2005). 
 68. Cf. Randal Picker, Entry, Access and Facilities-Based Competition, in AM. L. & 
ECON. ASS’N ANN. MEETINGS (The Berkeley Electronic Press Working Paper No. 33, Apr. 
29, 2004). 
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to build an entirely new network designed, say, to offer voice services, it 
is free to do so.  The existence of the Internet for new facilities 
deployment seems irrelevant.  Indeed, Yoo seems to have it backward: if 
the neutral network is no good for certain applications, that would drive 
facilities-based competition, not inhibit it.  A neutral network should be 
expected to drive an efficient mix of shared and facilities-based 
competition: those applications which can be run over the open network 
will be, and for those that require entirely new facilities, new facilities 
will be built.  Much of the cell-phone networks, for example, were built 
in the 1990s, and the Internet proved no barrier. 
In fact the facilities-based competition that Yoo sees as ideal is our 
present reality.  The existing telephone network is Yoo’s ‘‘prioritized’’ 
network that facilitates a time-sensitive application, telephony, as are the 
mobile-phone networks.  Meanwhile, the cable television network is a 
network specialized for ‘‘one-to-many’’ video.  Perhaps Yoo’s point is that 
these various specialized networks are likely to remain in our lives, but 
that doesn’t say much about how the Internet should be regulated. 
Second, Yoo’s premise that vigorous competition at every layer is 
always better for the consumer is overstated.  He downplays, to the point 
of elimination, the basic economic benefits of standardization.  And 
when it comes to technology platforms or other areas of economic 
development it is easy to envision scenarios where standardization means 
less competition but is nonetheless socially beneficial, which impeaches 
Yoo’s premise. 
Here is an intuitive demonstration of the point.  Most people in the 
United States speak a standard language, English.  This undoubtedly 
leads to some sacrifice. We lose, for example, the precision of German; 
we lack the Chinese vocabulary for food; and we lose righteousness and 
occasional elegance of the French language.  But few would argue that 
vigorous and ongoing competition for a standard American language 
would clearly serve consumer welfare.  It would be, instead, the Tower of 
Babel. 
The same observation holds for standardized technology platforms 
such as the Windows operating system or the TCP/IP protocol, which 
bring a variety of benefits for application developers and end users.  
Application writers need only write for a single platform, for example, 
and can expect to reach a much larger addressable market, thereby 
justifying greater investments.  End-users, given a single standard, share 
information with ease.  All of these advantages usually go under the 
rough heading of network externalities, or the economic benefits of 
standardization.  Yoo is, in essence, failing to take seriously the benefits 
of platform standardization in his product differentiation model.  To be 
sure, as with language, there are costs from uncompetitive platform 
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markets. The result will in all likelihood be an inferior platform (for want 
of competition), and the possibility of anti-competitive conduct.  But the 
fact that we face a balance of costs and benefits shrinks Yoo’s point.  We 
are left instead with the empirical question: how valuable are neutral 
standards and networks, and when are they worth a loss in competition 
in the network? 
Yoo and others who favor the encouragement of market entry 
should in fact favor basic network neutrality rules.  True enough, such 
rules may slow some competition for the standards for the Internet’s 
basic protocols.  But if that’s truly the case, nothing in NN rules, prevent 
full facilities-based competition.  And meanwhile NN rules facilitate 
market entry on the standardized and highly successful network we do 
have.  These and other reasons should prompt those Deregulationists 
opposed to network neutrality principles to ask whether they are on the 
wrong side of the argument. 
CONCLUSION 
I’ve suggested here that reconciliation of the broadband debate is 
plausible, but unfortunately that doesn’t make it inevitable.  A serious 
contribution to this problem has come from the winner-take-all 
approach of some of the groups on each side. The Internet Service 
Providers have seemed committed to achieving full open access rules 
through litigation, again showing that companies in fear of death turn to 
lawyers with the same urgency that dying people turn to doctors.  And 
the cable industry, while it has laudably adhered to neutral practices 
during the last period of intense scrutiny, still seems unwilling to agree 
with a simple neutrality rule that would codify its existing practices and 
do much to remove regulatory scrutiny.  As this goes, it should be 
recognized that the age of regulatory uncertainty surrounding broadband 
will soon reach its first decade.  That fact alone should prompt all 
interested parties to seek reconciliation sooner rather than later. 
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APPENDIX A: 
DRAFT NETWORK NEUTRALITY RULE 
 
§ 1.  General Right to Unrestricted Network Usage.  Broadband 
Users have the right reasonably to use their Internet connection in ways 
which are not illegal or harmful to the network.  Accordingly neither 
Broadband Operators nor the Federal Communications Commission 
shall impose restrictions on the use of an Internet connection except as 
necessary to: 
(1) Comply with any legal duty created by federal, state or local 
statute, or as necessary to comply with any executive order, warrant, legal 
injunction, subpoena, or other duly authorized governmental directive; 
(2) Prevent physical harm to the local Broadband Network caused 
by any network attachment or network usage; 
(3) Prevent Broadband users from interfering with other Broadband 
or Internet Users’ use of their Internet connections, including but not 
limited to neutral limits on bandwidth usage, limits on mass transmission 
of unsolicited email, and limits on the distribution of computer viruses, 
worms, and limits on denial-of service-or other attacks on others; 
(4) Prevent violations of the security of the Broadband network, 
including all efforts to gain unauthorized access to computers on the 
Broadband network or Internet; 
(5) Serve any other purpose specifically authorized by the Federal 
Communications Commission, based on a weighing of the specific costs 
and benefit of the restriction. 
 
§ 2. As used in this section, 
(1) ‘‘Broadband Operators’’ means a service provider that provides 
high-speed connections to the Internet using whatever technology, 
including but not limited to cable networks, telephone networks, fiber 
optic connections, and wireless transmission; 
(2) ‘‘Broadband Users’’ means residential and business customers of 
a Broadband Operator; 
(3) ‘‘Broadband Network’’ means the physical network owned and 
operated by the Broadband Operator; 
(4) ‘‘Restrictions on the Use of an Internet Connection’’ means any 
contractual, technical, or other limits placed with or without notice on 
the Broadband user’s Internet Connection. 
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